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MODEST PROPOSALS FOR A COMPLEX PROBLEM: PATENT 
MISUSE AND INCREMENTAL CHANGES TO THE HATCH-
WAXMAN ACT AS SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF 
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the country struggles with myriad economic problems, the 
escalating cost of health care in the United States has attracted much 
attention.! The high cost of brand-name medications is one issue in 
the spotlight.2 In 2008, Americans spent $2,339 billion on health 
care, accounting for 16.2% of the country's gross domestic product. 3 
Of that, $234.1 billion was spent on prescription medications.4 The 
Kaiser Family Foundation reports that prescription drugs account for 
approximately 10% of health care spending in the United States 
annually. 5 Further, the Department of Health and Human Services 
projects that prescription drug spending will increase from $234.1 
billion in 2008 to $457.8 billion in 2019, almost doubling over the 
II-year period.6 
The introduction of generic medications can reduce the cost of 
medications to consumers.? However, the entry of generic 
1. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Economy Led Americans to Limit Use of Routine Health 
Services, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,2010, at A14. 
2. See, e.g., Editorial, The High Cost of Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.coml2007 111125/0pinionl25sunl.html ?pagewanted= aiL 
3. eMS Office of the Actuary, Health Spending Climbs to 16.2% ofGDP, HEALTHCARE 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 25, 20 I 0), http://healthcare-economist.coml2010/01l25/health-
spending-climbs-to-16-2-of-gdp/; u.s. Total Real National Health Expenditures 
Using Alternative Price Deflators: 1929 to 2019, AMERICAN, www.google.com 
(search "Google" for "u.s. Total Real National Health Expenditures Using 
Alternative Price Deflators: 1929 to 2019"; click on the link titled, "Table 1.1 The 
American") (last visited May 30,2012). 
4. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/uploadl3057-08.pdf. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 8. 
7. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, FDA, http://www.fda.gov 
/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapprovedlapprovalappl 
ications/abbreviatednewdrugapplicationandagenerics/default.htm (last visited May 30, 
2012) ("A generic drug product is one that is comparable to an innovator drug product 
in dosage form, strength, route of administration, quality, performance 
characteristicsand mtended use. "). 
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medications to the market prior to the expiration of a brand-name 
medication's patent is anything but simple, and the brand-name 
manufacturer often files suit against the generic challenger for patent 
infringement. 8 
Due to these suits between brand-name drug manufacturers and 
generic drug manufacturers, so-called "reverse payment settlements" 
are on the rise. 9 The agreements earned their name because unlike a 
typical settlement, the patent holder who brought the suit pays or 
otherwise compensates the alleged infringer, the generic 
manufacturer. \0 Some critics label these agreements as "pay to 
delay" agreements because generic drug manufacturers often receive 
substantial payments or other incentives in exchange for delaying or 
not marketing the sale of their generic competitors. I I As a result, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Department of Justice, and 
private parties, such as consumers, have challenged these agreements 
as violations of antitrust law. 12 A split between the Sixth, Second, 
Eleventh, and Federal circuits has emerged. 13 Congress has also 
proposed solutions through legislation such as the Preserve Access to 
Affordable Generics Act. 14 
This comment considers fIrst the process by which generic 
medications enter the market and the statutory incentives in place to 
encourage generic manufacturers to enter the market prior to the 
expiration of a brand-name medication's patent. 15 Second, different 
approaches adopted by the courts and proposed by Congress with 
respect to reverse payment settlements will be addressed. 16 Finally, 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. FTC, PAY FOR DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS, 
AN FTC STAFF STUDY 1, 8 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/osI2010/01l 
100112payfordelayrpt.pdf (noting that manufacturers entered three such agreements 
in 2005, fourteen in 2006, fourteen in 2007, sixteen in 2008, and nineteen in 2009). 
10. 10blove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187, 
205 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The 
Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 335 (2000» ("Payments pursuant to the 
settlement of a patent suit such as those required under the Settlement Agreement are 
referred to as "reverse" payments because, by contrast, '[t]ypically, in patent 
infringement cases the payment flows from the alleged infringer to the patent 
holder. '''). 
II. See, e.g., Editorial, Faint Progress on Drug Payoffs, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 10, 2010, at 
A24. 
12. See infra Part IV.B. 
13. See infra Part IV.B. 
14. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S.27, 112th Congo (2011); see infra Part 
IV.e. 
15. See infra Parts II-III. 
16. See infra Part IV. 
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alternative solutions will be addressed including whether an ample 
solution to the perceived problem of reverse payment settlements 
already exists under the doctrine 0 f patent misuse or if an incremental 
change to the Hatch-Waxman Act, tweaking the incentives available 
to the first generic manufacturer to enter the market, offers the best 
solution. 17 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
In response to escalating drug costs, Congress changed the way 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves new drugs for 
marketing and sale in the United States in 1984 when it passed the 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch-
Waxman Act).18 The legislation sought to lower the average price 
paid by consumers for prescription pharmaceuticals. 19 To achieve 
this goal, the Act established an abbreviated new drug application 
(ANDA) to bring generic drugs to the market faster. 2o The Act also 
included provisions to encourage generic manufacturers to challenge 
the patents of brand-name pharmaceutical companies. 21 
1. Abbreviated New Drug Applications: Getting Generics to 
Market Faster 
Prior to the change in the law, manufacturers seeking to market a 
generic version of an existing drug faced the same rigorous standards 
as new drug applications (NDA).22 Today, a generic manufacturer of 
a previously patented medication can circumvent many of the 
restrictions on the original manufacturer. 23 Generic manufacturers 
17. See infra Part V. 
18. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417,98 Stat. 1538 (codified as amended in scattered sections of21 & 35 U.S.c.). 
19. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, n.2 (lith Cir. 2005). The legislation 
also served a goal somewhat at odds with reducing consumer prices, "preserv[ing] the 
technologies pioneered by the brand-name pharmaceutical companies" and continuing 
to encourage research and development. See id. 
20. Id. 
21. See i1!fra Part II. A. 1-2. 
22. See 21 U.S.c. § 355(a)-(b) (2006); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-
Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
187, 187 (1999); Fiona M. Scott Morton, Entry Decisions in the Generic 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 30 RANDJ. EeoN. 421,422 (1999). 
23. 21 U.S.c. § 355U) (2006). 
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filing an ANDA avoid the lengthy and costly process of 
independently demonstrating the safety and efficacy of their products 
because they need only to "demonstrate the 'bioequivalence' [of the 
generic medication] to an already-approved innovator drug.,,24 
Generic manufacturers can also file an application for approval 
through the FDA prior to the expiration of the brand-name patent.25 
Since 1984, the number of generic pharmaceuticals entering the 
market has risen dramatically. 26 Prior to the enactment of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, generic medications for top-selling drugs could take 
more than three years to enter the market following the expiration of 
the brand-name drug's patent.27 Today, introduction of a generic 
often occurs in less than three months after a brand-name drug's 
patent expires. 28 
2. Additional Incentives for Generics to Enter the Market Sooner 
Streamlining the application process for generic manufacturers is 
only one mechanism built into the Hatch-Waxman Act to bring less 
expensive generic medications to consumers faster. The Hatch-
Waxman Act also contains a provision that encourages generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to challenge the validity of the patents 
of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers prior to their 
expiration. 29 
24. CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS 
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at xii (1998), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/phann.pdf. "Bioequivalence 
means that the active ingredient is absorbed at the same rate and to the same extent for 
the generic drug as for the innovator drug." Id. 
25. 21 U.S.c. § 355(j); see also infra Part HA2. 
26. CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at 27. 
Since the [Hatch-Waxman Act] became law in 1984, the market 
share of generic drugs has indeed been rising steadily-although 
not all of that increase stems from the act. For drugs that come III 
easily countable units. such as tablets and capsules, the share of 
generic units sold more than doubled between 1984 and 1996-
from 18.6 percent of all drug units sold to 42.6 percent. 
Id. A greater desire by consumers to purchase generic medications as well as changes 
to state laws making it easier for phannacists to prescribe generic substitutes are two 
other sources for the change. Id. at xiv. 
27. Id. at ix. 
28. Id. 
29. Op-Ed., The "Pay for Delay" Rap: The Drug Industry, the FTC and Overzealous 
Antitrust, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2010, at A22. 
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a. Paragraph IV certifications 
During the application process, an ANDA filer must submit one of 
four types of certifications.30 The most common of these 
certifications are so-called "Paragraph III" and "Paragraph IV" 
certifications. In a Paragraph III certification, the ANDA applicant 
indicates that the FDA should certify its application upon the 
expiration of the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent.3l By filing a 
so-called "Paragraph IV certification," the applicant certifies that the 
relevant patent(s) on the brand-name drug are either "invalid or will 
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for 
which the application is submitted. ,,)2 
Once the FDA receives an ANDA filing, it has 180 days to accept 
it. 33 After the FDA accepts an application containing a Paragraph IV 
certification, the ANDA filer has twenty days to notify the brand-
name patent holder of its application. 34 Specifically, the ANDA 
applicant must inform the brand:name patent holder of the reasons 
the applicant believes the patent is either not infringed or is invalid. 35 
The patent owner then has forty-five days to respond. 36 If the patent 
owner sues for infringement within this period, the FDA institutes an 
automatic thirty-month stay on the generic manufacturer's ANDA 
approval.3? This stay remains effective until the end of thirty months 
30. 21 U.S.c. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
Jd. 
[A] certification, in the opinion oqhe applicant and to the best of 
his knowledge, with respect to each patent which claims the listed 
drug referred to in clause (i) or which claims a use for such listed 
drug for which the applicant is seeking approval under this 
subsection and for which information is required to be filed under 
subsection (b) or (c) of this section-(n that such patent information has not been filed, (In that such patent has expired, 
(lIn of the date on which such patent will expire, or 
(N) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the 
application is submitted. 
31. Jd. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IIn. 
32. Jd. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(N). 
33. Jd. § 355(j)(5)(A). 
34. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b)(3)(B)(i) (2010). 
35. 21 U.S.c. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2006). 
36. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
37. Id. 
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or until a court decision is reached regarding the infringement suit, 
whichever is earlier. 38 
b. l80-day exclusivity period granted to first ANDAfiler 
The fIrst ANDA fIler to make a Paragraph IV certifIcation and 
gain FDA approval is rewarded with a I80-day market exclusivity 
during which no subsequent ANDA fIlers can commence marketing 
of their own generic version ofthe drug. 39 As discussed in Part IV.A, 
when this exclusivity period commences depends on the 
circumstances.40 As a result of this exclusivity period, more generic 
fIlers are seeking to enter the market sooner and Paragraph IV fIlings 
have substantially increased.41 
III. RISE OF "REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT" 
AGREEMENTS 
The lure of a I80-day exclusivity period to generic pharmaceutical 
manufacturers as well as the high stakes at play for brand-name 
manufacturers facing Paragraph IV challenges has had a signifIcant 
impact on the way such suits are litigated and settled. 42 As a result, 
reverse payment settlement agreements between brand-name and 
generic medication manufacturers are on the rise. 43 These 
38. Jd. Notably, launching a generic pharmaceutical at the end of the thirty-month stay 
but before a court decision regarding the Paragraph N certification is not without 
risks. Generic companies whose products are found to infringe after such a launch 
may be liable for treble damages. RBC CAPITAL MKTS. CORP., PHARMACEUTICALS: 
ANALYZING LITIGATION SUCCESS RATES 3-4 (2010), available at 
http://amlawdaily.typepad. com/pharmareport. pdf. 
39. 21 U.S.c. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
40. See infra Part N.A. 
41. RBC CAPITAL MKTS. CORP., supra note 38, at 3 (indicating the following trend for 
first-to-file lawsuits since 2003: thirteen (2003), fifteen (2004), twenty-four (2005), 
twenty-seven (2006), forty-three (2007), fifty-one (2008), and sixty-five (2009». 
42. Loss or expiration of patent protection ofa brand-name pharmaceutical has significant 
implications for its manufacturer. For example, Pfizer's anticipated yearly revenue 
loss due to the expiration of its Lipitor patent was $10 billion. Duff Wilson, Drug 
Firms Face Billions in Losses in '11 as Patents End, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2011, at 
AI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/business/07drug.html?page 
wanted=2&sq=Drug Firms Face Billions in Losses in 'II as Patents 
End&st=cse&scp=1. When its patent for Claritin expired in 2003, Schering Plough 
saw its stocks' value drop 20% while annual sales for the drug plummeted from $2 
billion in 2002 to less than $200 million in the first half of 2003. Amy Tsao, 
Schering-Plough: Drugmaker, Heal Thyself, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, June II, 2003, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/contentijun2003/tc20030611_0956 _tc055. 
htm. 
43. FTC, supra note 9, at 1. 
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agreements earned their name because they travel in the opposite 
direction of a typical settlement-the patent holder who brought the 
suit originally makes a settlement payment to the alleged infringer, 
the generic manufacturer. 44 
Reverse payment settlements take a variety of forms. They can 
vary from a cash payment from the brand-name to the generic 
manufacturer to an agreement by the generic manufacturer to stay out 
of the market for a set period of time (''with or without royalty 
payments to the brand-name manufacturer,,).45 Agreements can also 
include provisions for "ancillary business transactions such as cross-
licensing or supply agreements" or provide that the brand-name 
manufacturer will not market or license an authorized generic for a 
set time after the generic manufacturer launches its product. 46 It is 
not uncommon for agreements to include a combination of these 
provisions.47 
A. Impact of Reverse Payment Settlements on Consumers 
The introduction of generic versions of brand-name medications 
has the potential to significantly lower the cost of pharmaceuticals to 
consumers over time. As such, reverse payment settlements are 
criticized in part due to their potential to slow consumers' access to 
generic medications and keep medication prices higher for longer. 48 
In 2008, on average, brand-name prescription medications cost four 
times more than generic medications ($137.90 compared to $35.22).49 
In that same year, generic medications accounted for 22% of the total 
drug sales in the United States and 72% of the total prescriptions 
dispensed. 50 
While the exact impact of the introduction of generic 
pharmaceuticals on consumer prices is subject to some debate,51 it is 
44. See supra note 10. 
45. Bret Dickey, Jonathan Orszag & Laura Tyson, An Economic Assessment of Patent 
Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 374 (2010). 
46. Id. An authorized generic is a drug that has been approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration as a brand-name medication, which the brand-name manufacturer 
decides to market simultaneously with the brand-name version of its medication, but 
under different trade dress and at a generic price. FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERICS: AN 
INTERIM REpORT 1 (2009), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/2009/061P062105 
authorizedgenericsreport.pdf. 
47. See infra Part N.B. 
48. Faint Progress on Drug Payoffs, supra note II. 
49. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 4, at 3. 
50. Id. at 4. 
51. See CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at 29. 
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clear that increased competition reduces prices. 52 Studies by the FDA 
indicate the fIrst generic competitor typically enters the marketplace 
at a price point only slightly lower than its brand-name counterpart, 
resulting in only small savings to a consumer. 53 However, the 
entrance of a second generic manufacturer to the market can decrease 
the cost of a generic version of a medication to half that of its brand-
name counterpart. 54 Further, the entry of a signifIcant number of 
generic manufacturers into the marketplace can result in a price point 
for the generic medications at a rate 20% or lower than the cost of the 
brand-name drug.55 
A Congressional Budget OffIce (CBO) report suggests a slightly 
different impact on prices as the result of the introduction of generic 
pharmaceuticals than the FDA's estimates. 56 The CBO report 
indicates that the fITst generic competitor to enter the market typically 
enters at a price point 25% lower than the brand-name 
pharmaceutical. 57 The introduction of additional generic medications 
can lower the market price by as much as 60% of the brand-name 
price. 58 
The FTC estimates that reverse payment settlements cost 
American consumers anywhere between $0.6 billion and $7.5 billion 
each year, or $3.5 billion each year on average. 59 As such, the FTC 
asserts that banning these agreements outright has the potential to 
save consumers $35 billion over the course of a decade. 60 
52. FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM iMPACT, 
at ii-iii, 63, 118 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011108/2011generic 
drugreport.pdf; Generic Competition and Drug Prices, FDA, available at 
http://www. fda. govl AboutFD NCentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandT obaccol 
CDERlucm129385.htm. 
53. Generic Competition and Drug Prices, supra note 52. 
54. Id. 
55. Id.; see also CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at xiii ("[W]hen one to 10 firms 
are manufacturing and distributing generic forms of a particular drug, the generic 
retail price of that drug averages about 60 percent of the brand-name price. When 
more than 1 0 manufacturers have entered the market, the average generic prescription 
price falls to less than half of the brand-name price. "). 
Paradoxically, the Congressional Budget Office study also suggested that brand-name 
pharmaceutical prices actually increase after the introduction of a generic competitor. 
Id. at 29. One study found a one percent increase in the brand-name price as a result 
of each new generic competitor that entered the marketplace. Id. 
56. CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at xlli. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. FTC, supra note 9, at 8, 10. 
60. Id. (calculating the ten-year average on the basis of the $3.5 billion per year average). 
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B. l80-day Exclusivity Period and Its Impact on Reverse Payment 
Settlements 
Eligibility for the 180-day exclusivity period is a significant 
incentive to generic manufacturers to be the fIrst ANDA filer since 
they are guaranteed a window of time where they are competing only 
with the brand-name manufacturer.61 Further, even if the fIrst ANDA 
filer enters the market at a price point as much as 25% below the 
brand-name price, it still enjoys a greater profit margin than 
subsequent generic manufacturers who might drive generic prices 
down to less than 50% of the market price of the brand-name drug.62 
The exclusivity period also bestows upon the fIrst ANDA filer a 
unique bargaining power, which fuels the reverse payment settlement 
system.63 In some situations, a generic manufacturer has strong 
incentives to settle an infringement suit rather than proceed to trial. 
For example, the potential profits the generic manufacturer stands to 
gain on entry into the market may be outweighed by the potential loss 
in profits faced by the brand-name manufacturer when it must 
compete with a generic medication. 64 The uncertainties of the 
litigation process can also influence generic and brand-name 
manufacturers, with the generic manufacturer settling to avoid the 
"risk of losing the case and being unable to market during the life of 
the patent" and the brand-name settling in order to avoid the risk of 
"losing the case and revenues from the patent exclusivity altogether" 
if the court fmds its patent invalid. 65 
61. See supra Part II.A.2.b. 
62. See CONGo BUDGET OFFICE. supra note 24, at xiii; see also text accompanying notes 
57-58. 
63. Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why 
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REv. 57,90,91 n.201, 92-93 (2010). 
64. Id. at 93. 
[If] the ANDA filer has a ten percent chance of victory at trial, the 
generic stands to earn $10 million if it wins and enters the market, 
and the patent holder stands to lose $200 million if it loses its 
monopoly. The ANDA filer's expected value is $1 million ($10 
million multiplied by a ten percent chance of victory). The patent 
holder's expected loss is $20 million ($200 million multiplied by a 
ten percent chance of loss at trial). These different expected 
values establish a bargaining range of $1 million to $20 million. 
Id. at 94. 
65. Gerard Sobel, Consideration of Patent Validity in Antitrust Cases Challenging Hatch-
Waxman Act Settlements, 20 FED. OR. 8J. 47, 52 (2010). 
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Importantly, due to more recent changes in the law, the fIrst 
ANDA fIler retains its 180-day exclusivity period despite entering a 
settlement.66 As a result, some agreements offer a compromise 
between the two extremes, with a fIrst ANDA fIler agreeing to delay 
marketing of its generic for a specifIed period, but still being able to 
commence sales prior to the expiration of the brand-name drug's 
patent. 67 Given these considerations, both the brand-name 
manufacturer and the fIrst ANDA fIler stand to benefIt greatly in 
some circumstances by settling their lawsuit and preventing or 
delaying the generic medication's entry into the market. 
IV. APPROACHES TO THE REVERSE PAYMENT PROBLEM 
Although no such agreements were entered into in 2004, a recent 
study indicates that reverse payment settlements have been rising 
steadily over the last few years. 68 The increased prevalence of these 
agreements has led to myriad proposed solutions with some courts 
and critics considering them to be illegal restraints of trade that 
should be subject to antitrust law. 69 
A. An Early Effort: The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003 
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) , represents one attempt to deal 
with the continued rise of prescription drug prices and the advent of 
reverse payment settlements following the implementation of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.70 The MMA effectively changed the playing 
fIeld by altering the events that trigger an ANDA fIler's 180-day 
exclusivity period and implementing six provisions whereby the fIrst 
ANDA fIler forfeits the exclusivity period. 
Prior to MMA, the earlier of one of two events could trigger the 
180-day exclusivity period: (l) a fmal court decision holding the 
brand-name patent invalid, unenforceable, or uninfringed, or (2) the 
commencement of commercial sales by the fIrst ANDA applicant. 71 
66. See infra Part IVA 
67. See infra Part IV.B.2.b. 
68. FTC, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that manufacturers entered three such agreements in 
2005, fourteen in 2006, fourteen in 2007, sixteen in 2008, and nineteen in 2009). 
69. See infra Part IV.B. 
70. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.c.). 
71. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD 
Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 901 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.c. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000) (amended 2003)). 
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As a result, if a brand-name and generic manufacturer entered a 
reverse payment settlement, subsequent ANDA filers were 
effectively blocked from entering the market until the expiration of 
the brand-name patent because the ftrst ANDA filer's 180-day 
exclusivity period was never triggered. 72 Under the MMA, the 180-
day exclusivity period can now be triggered only by the 
commencement of commercial sales by the first ANDA filer. 73 
Additionally, the 180-day exclusivity period is limited in that it does 
not extend beyond the life of the patent of the innovator drug. 74 
The MMA also added six provisions whereby the first ANDA filer 
would forfeit its 180-day exclusivity period. 75 If all ftrst ANDA filers 
forfeit their 180-day exclusivity, subsequent ANDA applicants are 
ineligible for the 180-day exclusivity period, but can still attempt to 
enter the market prior to the expiration of the brand-name patent. 76 
First, forfeiture can result from the withdrawal of the ANDA 
filer's application77 or second, by amendment of the Paragraph IV 
certiftcation after filing. 78 Third, failure of the ANDA filer to obtain 
approval of its application from the FDA within thirty months of 
filing also triggers forfeiture of the exclusivity period.79 Fourth, the 
expiration of the relevant innovator patents can trigger forfeiture of 
the exclusivity period. 80 Fifth, if the ftrst ANDA filer enters an 
72. 21 U.S.c. § 355G)(5)(B)(iv) (2000) (amended 2003). 
73. 21 U.S.c. § 355(j)(5)(D) (2006). 
74. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II). Following the expiration of the innovator patent, the 
ANDA filer's Paragraph IV certification is reclassified under Paragraph II, which 
certifies that the brand-name patent has expired. See id. § 355G)(2)(A)(vii)(II), (IV). 
75. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(I)-(VI). Use of these forfeiture provisions is relatively rare. See 
Kurt R Karst, Taking Stock of FDA's lBO-Day Exclusivity Forfeiture Decisions-A 
Forfeiture Scorecard, FDA L. BLOG (Jan. 26, 2010, 3:46 PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fdaJaw_blog_hyman-IJhelps/2010/01/taking-stock-of-
IS0day-exclusivity-forfeiture-a-forfeiture-scorecard-.html. Between their enactment 
in 2003 and 2009, only thirteen ANDA applicants forfeited their exclusivity period 
with the majority (ten) losing the marketing right due to failure to obtain tentative 
approval within a thirty-month period. Id. 
76. 21 U.S.c. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii). The "term 'first applicant' means an applicant that ... 
submits a substantially complete application" according to the requirements of the 
statute. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(II)(bb). Theoretically, more than one generic 
manufacturer can qualify as a first filer, and, thus, two or more companies could share 
the ISO-day exclusivity period in cases where more than one "substantially complete" 
ANDA application is filed on the same day. 
77. ld. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(II). 
7S. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(III). 
79. !d. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV). 
SO. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI). 
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agreement with another applicant, the marketing exclusivity period is 
forfeited. 81 
Finally, the most problematic of the six provisions provides that 
the fIrst ANDA fIler can forfeit exclusivity by failing to market the 
product. 82 This forfeiture event is contingent upon the occurrence of 
two triggering events. 83 SpecifIcally, the statute defmes a failure to 
market a drug as the later of one of two dates. 84 First, under 
21 USC 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa) ("(aa)"), the earlier of either 75 days 
after the approval of the fIrst ANDA fIler's application or 30 months 
after the date of submission of the fIrst ANDA fIler's application. 85 
Second, under 21 USC 35 5(j)( 5)(D)( i) (I) (bb ) ("(bb )"), 75 days after 
one of the following: (1) a fmal court decision ("other than on 
petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari") that all of the 
brand-name patents challenged by the fIrst ANDA fIler's Paragraph 
IV certifIcation are invalid or not infringed; (2) a settlement in an 
infringement action in which the court enters a fInal judgment that 
includes a judicial fmding that the brand-name patents challenged by 
the fIrst ANDA fIler's Paragraph IV certifIcation are invalid or not 
infringed; or (3) the brand-name manufacturer withdraws the patents 
subject to the challenge of the fIrst ANDA filer's Paragraph IV 
certifIcation. 86 However, these provisions still do not obviate the 
81. Id. 
82. Id. § 355G)(5)(D)(i)(I). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. § 355G)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa). 
Id. 
The first applicant fails to market the drug by the later of-
(aa) the earlier of the date that is-
(AA) 75 days after the date on which the approval of the 
application of the first applicant is made effective under 
subparagraph (B)(iii); or 
(BB) 30 months after the date of submission of the application 
of the first applicant; .... 
86. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb). 
[W]ith respect to the first applicant or any other applicant (which 
other applicant has received tentative approval), the date that is 75 
days after the date as of which, as to each of the patents with 
respect to which the first applicant submitted and lawfully 
maintained a certification qualifying the first applicant for the 
180-day exclusivity period under subparagraph (B)(iv), at least 1 
of the following has occurred: 
(AA) In an infringement action brought against that applicant 
with respect to the patent or in a declaratory judgment action 
brought by that applicant with respect to the patent, a court enters 
a final decision from which no appeal (other than a petition to the 
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need for a fmal court decision regarding the validity of the brand-
name manufacturer's patent to trigger the forfeiture of the I80-day 
exclusivity period because both an (aa) and a (bb) event must occur 
in order for the forfeiture provision to kick in. 87 
Given these six provisions, while there are now more ways that 
the I80-day exclusivity period can be triggered or forfeited, reverse 
payment settlements can still limit or bar the ability of subsequent 
ANDA filers to enter the market prior to the expiration of the brand-
name patent. Further, absent the incentive of the exclusivity period, 
some generic manufacturers may be reticent to seek to enter the 
market ahead of the brand-name patent's expiration given the 
potential to be sued by the brand-name manufacturer for 
infringement. 88 
B. Reaction of the Courts: Reverse Payment Settlements and 
Antitrust Law 
The courts have differed when addressing the question of whether 
reverse payment settlements violate the antitrust provisions of the 
Sherman Act. Specifically, the Sherman Act prohibits "[ e ]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.,,89 
"[M]onopoliz[ation], or attempt[s] to monopolize, or combin[ations] 
or conspir[acies] ... to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States" are also forbidden. 90 In order to establish 
an antitrust cause of action, a plaintiff must prove (1) injury in fact; 
Id. 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken 
that the patent is invalid or not infringed. 
(BB) In an infringement action or a declaratory judgment 
action described in sub item (AA), a court signs a settlement order 
or consent decree that enters a final judgment that includes a 
finding that the patent is invalid or not infringed. 
(CC) The patent information submitted under subsection (b) or 
(c) of this section is withdrawn by the holder of the application 
approved under subsection (b) of this section. 
87. See Teva North America, FDA Decision Letter: ANDA 77-165: Granisetron 
Hydrochloride Injection, ImglmL, Docket No. 2007N-0389 (Jan. 17,2008), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/docketsIDOCKETS/07n0389/07n-0389-1etOO03.pdf 
(finding that in absence of both an (aa) and (bb) date, the exclusivity period is not 
forfeited). 
88. See supra Part II.A2.a. 
89. 15 U.S.c. § I (2006). 
90. Id. § 2. 
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(2) proximate cause; and (3) antitrust injury-(a) the type of injury 
intended to be prevented by antitrust law and (b) an injury that "flows 
from that which makes the defendant's actions unlawful.,,91 
Cases involving reverse payment settlements have created a split 
between the circuits. The Sixth Circuit has held them to be unlawful 
per se.92 The Second Circuit and Federal Circuit have both found that 
reverse payment settlements are presumptively legal and within the 
scope of the brand-name manufacturer's patent rights. 93 The 
Eleventh Circuit applied a three-p-"'ong analysis accounting for "(1) 
the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to 
which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting 
anticompetitive effects. ,,94 Thus far the Supreme Court has denied 
certiorari on cases dealing with reverse payment settlements. 95 
1. Sixth Circuit Holds Reverse Payment Settlements Per Se Illegal 
In In re Cardizem, a group of consumers of the heart medication 
diltiazem hydrochloride filed suit against the drug's brand-name 
manufacturer, Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (HMR), and a generic 
manufacturer, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Andrx) of a less 
expensive version. 96 The plaintiffs alleged that the drug 
manufacturers violated the Sherman Act and state antitrust laws by 
entering into a settlement whereby Andrx agreed to refrain from 
marketing its generic version of the medication, even after FDA 
approval of its ANDA, in exchange for quarterly payments of $10 
million. 97 
The Sixth Circuit considered the use of the rule of reason, but 
ultimately adopted the rule that pay for delay agreements are 
unlawful per se and found the agreement constituted a classic case of 
91. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477,488-89 (1977). 
92. See, e.g., La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem 
CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 900, 907-08 (6th Cir. 2003). 
93. See, e.g., Ark. Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 104-D7 
(2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606, 1606 (2011); Ark. Carpenters Health & 
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciproflaxin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 544 
F.3d 1323, 1332, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2008); loblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re 
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187,212-13 (2d Cir. 2006). 
94. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (1Ith Cir. 2005) (citing Valley 
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11 th Cir. 2003)); see 
also Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d 1294. 
95. See, e.g., Ark. Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund, 604 F .3d at 104-07, cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. at 1606. 
96. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 899-902. The drug sold under the 
brand-name Cardizem CD. Jd 
97. Id. at 899-900. 
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horizontal restraint of trade in vio lation of the Sherman Act. 98 Some 
types of restraints, the court reasoned, are unlawful per se when "they 
'have such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and 
such limited potential for pro-competitive benefit. ,,,99 Under this 
approach, the parties' intent, the potential for a pro-competitive 
effect, or the lack of any actual impact on competition are 
irrelevant. 100 
2. The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits Allow Reverse 
Payment Settlements 
In cases involving reverse payment settlements, the Second, 
Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have all rejected the reasoning applied 
by the Sixth Circuit and held that reverse payment settlements are not 
presumptively unlawful under a variety of different approaches. 
a. Second Circuit case law favors settlements 
In In re Tamoxifen, a group of consumers, medical benefits 
providers, and consumer advocacy groups filed suit against the 
brand-name patent holder and the fITst ANDA filer for a cancer drug, 
tamoxifen, alleging that the reverse payment settlement between the 
two pharmaceutical companies created a monopoly in violation of the 
Sherman Act. !Ol Under the terms ofthe settlement agreement, which 
included a $21 million do lIar payment to the generic manufacturer to 
not sell its generic version of tamoxifen, subsequent ANDA filers 
were prevented from obtaining approval to sell their generic versions 
of the drug because the generic manufacturer's l80-day exclusivity 
period was never triggered. 102 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that reverse 
payment settlements are presumptively legal.!03 The court reasoned 
that reverse payment settlements fall within the scope of a brand-
98. Id. at 906-08. To apply a rule of reason analysis, the "finder of fact must decide 
whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, 
taking into account a variety of factors, including specific infonnation about the 
relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the 
restraint's history, nature, and effect." Id. at 906 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 3,10 (1997)). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 906-907 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984)). 
101. Joblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187, 
190 (2d Cir. 2006). 
102. Id. at 193-94. 
103. Id. at 206. 
598 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 41 
name manufacturer's patent even if they limit competition because 
"the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to 
protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly 
over the manufacture and distribution of the patented prodUCt."I04 
Further, such settlements make sense due to the high degree of risk 
borne by the brand-name manufacturer in the litigation compared to 
the relatively low risk faced by the ANDA filer. 105 Finally, even if a 
brand-name manufacturer's patent is weak and a reverse payment 
settlement helps extend it artificially, "[i]t is unlikely that the holder 
of a weak patent could stave off all possible challengers with 
exclusion payments because the economics simply would not justify 
it. ,,106 
The court also questioned whether the plaintiffs suffered an injury 
sufficient to support an antitrust claim, noting that "[t]he injury 
should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of 
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.,,107 Additionally, 
the court stated that even if the plaintiffs were assumed to have stated 
an antitrust violation and alleged a sufficient injury: 
any injury that the plaintiffs suffered ... resulted from [the 
brand-name manufacturer's] valid patent and from the 
inability of other generic manufacturers to establish that the 
patent was either invalid or not infringed-and not from any 
agreement between [the generic manufacturer and the 
brand-name manufacturer that the former] should employ its 
exclusivity powers to exclude competition. 108 
b. Federal Circuit/avors presumptive legality o/reverse payment 
settlements 
In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals considered a settlement between the 
brand-name patent holder, Bayer, and generic manufacturer, Barr, 
which had been challenged on antitrust grounds by a group of 
104. Jd. at 208-09. 
105. Jd. at 207. 
106. Jd. at 212 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 
514, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), afJ'd in part, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. 
Bayer AG, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), afJ'd, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010». 
107. Job/ave, 466 F.3d at 219 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 
U.S. 477, 489 (1977». 
108. Id. 
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consumers and advocacy groups. 109 Bayer agreed to pay Barr $49.1 
million to delay marketing its generic version of Cipro until six 
months before Bayer's brand-name patent expired.lJO The settlement 
also required Bayer to make quarterly payments to Barr for a seven-
year period totaling $349 million or to supply Barr with Cipro for 
resale. III 
Similar to the reasoning of the Second Circuit, the court 
determined that "the essence of the Agreements was to exclude the 
defendants from profiting from the patented invention," which was 
"well within Bayer's rights as the patentee.,,1l2 The court also 
emphasized the long-standing public policy in favor of settlement 
agreements in infringement litigation, particularly in Hatch-Waxman 
litigation where the relative risks for the brand-name manufacturer 
are high. 113 
c. Eleventh Circuit develops a three-part analysis to determine the 
legality of reverse payment settlements 
In Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 
pharmaceutical companies Schering-Plough, the brand-name patent 
holder, and Upsher-Smith Laboratories, the first ANDA filer, 
petitioned for a review of the FTC's determination that their patent 
infringement settlement agreement constituted an unreasonable 
restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. 1l4 As part of a June 
1997 settlement agreement in its suit against Upsher for patent 
infringement, Schering agreed to license the rights to several drugs 
owned by Upsher in exchange for the latter's agreement to delay 
marketing its generic version of Schering's drug, K-Dur 20 until at 
least September 2001.115 In 1998, Schering entered into settlement 
with another generic manufacturer, ESI, whereby ESI agreed to 
license two drugs to Schering and postpone marketing its version of 
109. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1328-30. 
110. Id. at 1328-29. 
111. Id. at 1329 & n.5. 
112. Id. at 1333. 
113. Id. at 1333 & n.11 (citing Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)); see also Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (lIth Cir. 
2005); Foster v. Hal1co Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469,477 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
114. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1058. The Eleventh Circuit also addressed the 
question of reverse payment settlements in an earlier case, Valley Drug Co. v Geneva 
Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,1296 (lIth Cir. 2003). 
115. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1058-59. The final terms of the licensing deal 
"called for Schering to pay (l) $60 million in initial royalty fees; (2) $10 million in 
milestone royalty payments; and (3) 10% or 15% royalties on sales." Id. at 1060. 
600 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 41 
K-Dur 20 until January 2004 in exchange for $5 million to cover 
legal fees and $15 million apiece for the two drug licenses. 116 
In 2001, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against 
Schering, Upsher, and ESI alleging that the settlement agreements 
violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
45 and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1.117 Specifically, 
the FTC had determined that the multimillion-dollar payments to 
Upsher and ESI did not represent "legitimate consideration" for the 
two agreements. 118 The FTC also claimed that "Schering 
monopolized and conspired to monopolize the potassium supplement 
market."119 In reaching its decision, the FTC "prohibited settlements 
under which the generic receives anything of value and agrees to 
defer its own research, development, production or sales 
activities. ,,120 
The court determined neither a per se or rule of reason approach 
was appropriate to analyze the settlements at issue. 121 The court 
recognized that Schering, by obtaining its initial patent for K-Dur 20, 
"obtained the legal right to exclude Upsher and ESI from the market 
until they proved either that [Schering's patent] was invalid or that 
their [generic] products ... did not infringe Schering's patent. ,,122 As 
such, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the anti-
competitive effects of the settlement agreement, after which the 
defendant must prove its pro-competitive objectives. Specifically, 
the Court stated that "the proper analysis of antitrust liability requires 
an examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the 
patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and 
(3) the resulting anticompetitive effects."123 
116. Id. at 1060-61 n.8. Specifically, the agreement included "$5 million noncontingent 
payment, representing legal fees, and an additional $10 million contingent on ESI's 
FDA approval. Schering and ESI also entered into a contemporaneous license 
agreement whereby ESI granted Schering the licenses to enalpril and buspirone in 
exchange for $15 million." Id 
117. Id at 1061. While the legality of ESI's agreement with Schering remained an issue at 
the trial, the complaint against it was withdrawn before the trial so it was not a party 
to any of the proceedings. Id. at 1061 n.9. 
118. Id. at 1062. 
119. Id at 1061. 
120. Id at 1062. The only exception under the FTC's standard was for payments to a 
generic manufacturer for up to $2 million in litigation fees so long as the Commission 
was notified ofthe settlement. 
121. !d. at 1065. 
122. Id at 1066-67. 
123. Id. at 1066 (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, l312 (lIth 
Cir. 2003)). 
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C. One Congressional Solution: The Preserving Access to 
Affordable Generics Act 
601 
The split between the federal circuit courts has led congressional 
members to propose resolutions of the conflict through the 
introduction of legislation, such as the "Preserve Access to 
Affordable Generics Act" (S. 27).124 First introduced during the 
109th Congress in 2006 as S. 3582, this legislation has lead to 
significant debate amongst congressional members. 125 During the 
111 th Congress, the bill's potential to pass in both chambers of 
Congress looked promising. 126 The House passed a companion 
version of the bill (H.R. 1706) as part of a supplemental 
appropriations bill; however, efforts to pass the bill in the Senate 
ultimately failed. 127 
124. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S.27, 1 12th Congo (20Il). Introduced 
by Sen. Herb Kohl (D-WI) with original co-sponsors Sens. Sherrod Brown (D-OH), 
Susan Collins (R-ME), Richard Durbin (D-IL), AI Franken (D-MN), Sen. Chuck 
Grassley (R-IA), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), and Bernard Sanders (D-VT). In addition 
to costing consumers a significant amount of money, the federal government also 
carries a substantial portion ofthe cost of prescription drugs. Jd at § 2(a)(5) ("Federal 
dollars currently account for an estimated 30 percent of the $235,000,000,000 spent 
on prescription drugs in 200S, and this share is expected to rise to 40 percent by 
201S."). 
125. See. e.g., Preserve Access to Mfordable Generics Act, S.35S2, 109th Congo (2006); 
Donald Zuhn, Pay-For-Delay Provision Added to Senate Appropriations Bill, PATENT 
Docs BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/0S/payfordelay-
provision-back -in-appropriations-bill.html. 
126. See S. 369: Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www. 
govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-369 (last visited May 30,2012). During the 
111 th Congress, the Committee on the Judiciary filed a written report (Report No. 
111-123) on S. 369 and minority views were filed; however, the proposed bill did not 
proceed to a Senate and House vote. Id. 
127. See Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009, H.R. 1706, 1IIth 
Congo (2009). During the I1lth Congress, the Senate version of the bill, Preserve 
Access to Mfordable Generics Act, S.369, 11lth Congo (2009), was attached to the 
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2011, S. 3677, 111 th 
Congo (2010) (enacted), in a hotly debated vote that came down largely along party 
lines. GPhA Comments on 15-15 Senate Appropriations Committee Vote on Patent 
Settlements, GENERIC PHARM. ASS'N (July 30, 2010), http://www.gphaonline.org/ 
medialpress-releases/20 IO/gpha-comments-I5-15-senate-appropriations-committee-
vote-patent-settlement. However, the addition was ultimately removed before the Act 
passed. Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2011, S. 
3677, 11lth Congo (2010) (enacted). 
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1. Provisions of the Preserving Access to Affordable Generics Act 
Contrary to the holdings of the Second, Eleventh, and Federal 
Circuits, under the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act and 
more in line with the approach favored by the FTC, nearly all 
agreements would be considered per se unlawful subject to a 
rebuttable presumption. 128 The proposed law permits the FTC to 
"initiate a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this section against 
the parties to any agreement resolving or settling, on a fmal or 
interim basis, a patent infringement claim in connection with the sale 
of a drug product.,,129 Specifically, any agreement where "an ANDA 
filer receives anything of value, and the ANDA filer agrees to limit or 
forego research, development, manufacturing, or sales of the ANDA 
product for any period of time" is presumptively anti-competitive and 
unlawful. 130 This provision essentially removes all of the burden of 
proof from the FTC and makes reverse payment agreements per se 
illegal, with few exceptions. 131 
To defeat the presumption of unlawfulness, the parties to an 
agreement must "demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
the pro-competitive benefits of the agreement outweigh [its] anti-
competitive effects."l32 To determine whether an agreement is not 
anti-competitive, the court would need to account for the following 
factors: 
(1) the length of time remaining until the end of the life of 
the relevant patent, compared with the agreed upon entry 
date for the ANDA product; 
(2) the value to consumers of the competition from the 
ANDA product allowed under the agreement; 
(3) the form and amount of consideration received by the 
ANDA filer in the agreement resolving or settling the patent 
infringement claim; 
(4) the revenue the ANDA filer would have received by 
winning the patent litigation; 
(5) the reduction in the NDA holder's revenues if it had lost 
the patent litigation; 
128. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
129. s. 27, § 28(a)(1). 
130. Id. § 28(a)(2). 
131. See id. 
132. Id. § 28(a)(2)(8). 
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6) the time period between the date of the agreement 
conveying value to the ANDA filer and the date of the 
settlement of the patent infringement claim; and 
(7) any other factor that the fact finder, in its discretion, 
deems relevant to its determination of competitive effects 
under this subsection. 133 
603 
2. Concerns with the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act 
If passed, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act has the 
potential to weed out some problematic reverse payment settlements; 
however, it also has the potential to interfere with agreements that 
can benefit consumers. Based on the information available, it is 
anything but clear as to whether every reverse payment settlement is 
anti-competitive by nature. 134 
Critics of an outright ban posit that it would "reduce the incentive 
to challenge patents by reducing the challenger's settlement options 
should he be sued for infringement, and so might well be thought 
anti-competitive.,,135 Further, other opponents suggest that some 
reverse settlements can actually be positive and result in generic 
drugs entering the market faster than they would have had litigation 
been pursued and before the expiration of the patent in question. 136 
An independent 2010 report from RBC Capital Markets concluded 
that of the thirty-seven new generic drug launches expected in 2010 
and 2011, twenty-four of them would launch prior to patent 
expiration because of settlements. 137 
Implementing a per se presumption against all agreements where 
the ANDA filer receives "anything of value" overcompensates for the 
problem posed by reverse payment settlements. Not all such 
agreements have an anticompetitive effect. Requiring the parties to 
prove the pro-competitive nature of their agreement has the potential 
to discourage valid settlements. 138 The additional costs and time 
133. Id. § 28(b). 
134. See id. § 28(a)(2). 
135. Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (N.D. lll. 
2003), dismissed, 104 F. App'x. 178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
136. The "Pay for Delay" Rap, supra note 29. 
137. RBC CAPITAL MKTS. CORP., supra note 38, at app. A. 
138. Yuki Onoe, "Pay-for-Delay" Settlements in Pharmaceutical Litigation: Drawing a 
Fine Line Between Patent Zone and Antitrust Zone, 9 J. MARSHALL REv. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 527,545-46 (2009); see also The "Pay for Delay'· Rap, supra note 29. "If 
the only choice is an expensive litigation death match that lasts for years, fewer 
604 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 41 
involved in litigating the various stipulations of the bill also has the 
potential to defeat the benefits of settling and to further hamper the 
efficiency of the legal system. 139 
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS: PATENT MISUSE AND 
INCREMENTAL CHANGES TO THE HATCH-WAXMAN 
ACT 
A significant problem with reverse payment settlements is their 
impact on both the ability and interest of subsequent ANDA filers to 
enter the market prior to the expiration of a brand-name 
manufacturer's patent. 140 
A. Patent Misuse: A Potential Solution to the Problem of Reverse 
Payment Settlements Without the Needfor Legislative Action by 
Congress 
An alternative means of triggering the forfeiture of the first 
AND A filer's I80-day exclusivity period would be for subsequent 
ANDA filers to invoke the defense of patent misuse in response to 
infringement charges by the brand-name manufacturer. With a lower 
threshold of proof than that required for a successful antitrust inquiry, 
a successful patent misuse defense to an infringement suit would 
result in the invalidation of the brand-name manufacturer's patent, 
thus opening the door to increased competition by other generic 
manufacturers and lower prices for consumers. 141 
1. The Advantages of Patent Misuse as a Solution 
Patent misuse has its origins in the equitable doctrine of unclean 
hands, "whereby a court of equity will not lend its support to 
enforcement of a patent that has been misused." 142 It is an affirmative 
generic companies will sue under the probability that they will themselves face patent 
infringement suits." Id 
139. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 63, at 109-10 (discussing Prof. Daniel Crane's 
proposition that requiring non-trial determinations as to the potential validity of an 
infringement suit as being akin to a "mini-trial" that would "swallow the benefits of 
settlement that parties seek"). 
140. See supra Part III. 
141. Marshall Leaffer, Patent Misuse and Innovation, 101. HIGH TECH L. 142, 147 (2010) 
(citing Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Abusing Intellectual Property Rights in Cyberspace: 
Patent Misuse Revisited, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 955, 988-89 (2002)). 
142. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Patent 
misuse originated as a court-made remedy rather than a legislative one. The Supreme 
Court first applied the doctrine in 1917 in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal 
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Section 271(d) of Title 35 of the U.S. Code 
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defense that can be invoked by a party charged with patent 
infringement or breach of a license agreement. 143 The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated, "[t]he key inquiry under 
this fact-intensive doctrine is whether, by imposing the condition, the 
patentee has 'impermissibly broadened the "physical or temporal 
scope" of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect. ",144 The 
doctrine of misuse is meant "to restrain practices that [do] not in 
themselves violate any law, but that [draw] anticompetitive strength 
from the patent right, and thus [are] deemed to be contrary to public 
policy.,,145 When a court fmds a party guilty of patent misuse, the 
judgment renders the patent in question unenforceable. 146 
Although some critics argue that the importance of patent misuse 
has waned thanks to the continued development of antitrust law, 
others argue that due to the fundamental differences between the two, 
patent misuse retains its validity in the modem age. 147 Most 
critically, a patent owner's conduct need not rise to the level of an 
addresses patent misuse briefly in the negative by defining some of the actions by a 
patent holder that do not constitute misuse, although the provision is not exhaustive. 
It states: 
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement 
or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by 
reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) 
derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without 
his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the 
patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if 
performed without his consent would constitute contributory 
infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights 
against infringement or contributory infringement; (4) refused to 
license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the 
license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented 
product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent 
or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the 
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant 
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or 
sale is conditioned. 
35 U.S.c. § 271(d)(2006). 
143. Leaffer, supra note 141, at 153. 
144. B. Braun Med.. Inc., 124 F.3d at 1426 (quoting Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 
782 F.2d 995,1001--02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
145. Mallinkrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
146. Leaffer, supra note 141, at 147 (citing Quinn, Jr., supra note 141, at 988-89). 
147. Jd. at 152-60. 
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antitrust violation in order for the defense of patent misuse to be 
raised by another party. 148 
Because defendants claiming patent misuse need not demonstrate 
that they have been harmed by the alleged misuse, the doctrine 
presents a novel solution to the impact of reverse payment 
settlements on subsequent ANDA filers.149 An affirmative defense, 
patent misuse could be used by subsequent ANDA filers seeking to 
challenge the I80-day exclusivity period of first ANDA filers. Under 
this approach, a subsequent ANDA filer being sued by the innovator 
patent owner for infringement can respond with the defense that the 
brand-name manufacturer misused its patent. 150 If successful, the 
innovator patent is invalidated, and the first ANDA filer would thus 
effectively forfeit its I80-day exclusivity period. lSI 
When faced with the possibility of having both the brand-name 
patent and the generic patent declared invalid due to a reverse 
payment agreement frustrating "the public good," both parties might 
be less likely to enter such an agreement in the first place. Although 
the subsequent ANDA filer would no longer have the incentive of the 
I80-day exclusivity period, it would still stand to gain much more by 
effectively opening up the marketplace to generic manufacturers. 
Still, the lack of I80-day exclusivity might be enough to discourage 
many takers from this option given the expense involved in pursuing 
litigation and the uncertainty of the outcome. 152 
2. Potential Problems with the Patent Misuse Defense: Disclosure 
of Settlement Agreements 
Typically, when two parties settle, the settlement agreement is 
done outside the court system entirely. If the two parties stipulate to 
a judgment, it is considered more as a contract between the parties 
148. Id. at 153-54. In order to establish an antitrust cause of action, a plaintiff must prove 
(1) injury in fact, (2) proximate cause, (3) antitrust injury-(a) the type of injury 
intended to be prevented by antitrust law and (b) an injury that "flows from that which 
makes defendant's acts unlawful." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 
U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977). "Patent misuse is viewed as a broader wrong than antitrust 
violation because of the economic power that may be derived from the patentee's right 
to exclude. Thus misuse may arise when the conditions of antitrust violation are not 
met." 6 R CARL Moy, MoY's WALKER ON PATENTS § 18:1 n.l0 (4th ed. 2011) 
(quoting C.R Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
149. Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1922, 1924 
(1997); see also supra Part IV.B.2.a-b (discussing the Second Circuit and Federal 
Circuit's approaches to reverse settlements). 
150. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419,1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
151. Leaffer, supra note 141, at 147. 
152. See Sobel, supra note 65, at 51-52; supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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than as a final judgment by the court. However, under the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 
(MMA), certain types of settlement agreements between brand-name 
manufacturers and generic manufacturers must be disclosed to the 
FTC within ten days of their execution. 153 Interestingly, the 
information disclosed to the FTC regarding the specifics of these 
agreements is kept secret from disclosure "except as may be relevant 
to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding." 154 
The inability to obtain information regarding the agreements a 
brand-name manufacturer has entered into with the first ANDA filer 
and other subsequent ANDA filers can pose a significant hurdle for 
subsequent ANDA filers seeking to enter the market prior to the 
expiration of the brand-name patent or invoke a patent misuse 
defense. In Pfizer Inc. et ai. v. Apotex Inc. et ai., Apotex, a 
subsequent ANDA filer, filed suit against Pfizer, the brand-name 
patent holder, seeking to trigger the 180-day marketing exclusivity 
period ofRanbaxy, the frrst ANDA filer, regarding Lipitor. 155 As part 
of its discovery requests, Apotex sought to obtain the settlement 
agreements and documents related to them between Pfizer and 
Ranbaxy.156 Pfizer attempted to block the discovery on the grounds 
that revealing the agreements and related documents and sought a 
protective order covering the documents on the grounds that they 
were confidential and would provide Apotex with an "immense 
competitive advantage.,,157 In deciding to grant Apotex access to the 
settlement agreements, the court recognized the value of such 
information to Apotex's suit on several grounds, including its relation 
to the considerations directly relevant to the patent at issue such as 
obviousness and commercial success. 158 The court also noted that 
Apotex might also be able to cultivate a defense of patent misuse 
against Pfizer if the evidence suggested that Pfizer induced Ranbaxy 
153. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, § 1112(a)(2) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 21 & 42 U.S.c.) (providing that agreements relating to "(A) the manufacture, 
marketing or sale of the brand name drug that is the listed drug in the ANDA 
involved; (B) the manufacture, marketing, or sale of the generic drug for which the 
ANDA was submitted; or (C) the 180-day [exclusivity] period" must be disclosed). 
154. Id. § 1114, 117 Stat. at 2463. The information is also used by the FTC to create 
reports aggregating general data on the prevalence of these agreements. See FTC, 
supra note 46, at 1. 
155. Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 744 F. Supp. 2d 758 (N.D. TIl. 2010). 
156. Id. at 761. 
157. Id. at 767. 
158. Id. at 762. 
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to settle by threatening an infringement claim based on the reissuing 
of the patent at issue. 159 
The secrecy of the reverse payment agreements has also recently 
been challenged by Cephalon who is seeking information from the 
FTC with regard to the specific agreements on which its reports are 
based due to the FTC's reliance on figures from these reports during 
the course of litigation. l60 The move has met with significant 
resistance by Pfizer and 35 other pharmaceutical companies, who 
assert that "[ d]isclosure of these settlement agreements and related 
documents in this matter would seriously damage the third parties' 
business and legal interests.,,161 
B. A Simpler Alternative: Opening the 180-day Exclusivity Period 
to Subsequent Filers 
By its nature, law develops incrementally over time and is not as 
prone to changes as drastic as those that Congress implements. 
Intellectual property law is no different. 162 An incremental approach 
to change is particularly beneficial in altering a very complex system, 
such as that employed in pharmaceutical patenting, where the 
outcome of changes cannot be predicted with confidence. 163 
Given the complexity of reverse payment settlements, the great 
variation in their terms, and the difficulty in efficiently and 
inexpensively determining whether they are pro- or anti-competitive 
in nature, an incremental change to the Hatch-Waxman Act may be a 
more appropriate solution than a piece of legislation as complicated 
as the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act. Indeed, making 
an adjustment to the system currently in place presents a simple 
solution with the potential to diffuse the problem of reverse payment 
settlements over time. 
1. The Patent System Provides an Incentive for Innovation 
At the core of the U.S. patent system is the idea that innovation 
can be encouraged by granting inventors the exclusive right to 
159. Id. (citing Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 731 F.Supp.2d 754, 760 (N.D. TIl. 2010)). 
160. Peter Loftus, Pfizer, 36 Other Drug Companies Want Patent Documents Kept Secret, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/artic1e/BT-CO-20110120-712765 
.html. 
161. Id. 
162. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law 
Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REv. 1543,1544-46 (2010). 
163. Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 587, 632 (2006). 
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manufacture, sell, and license their inventions for a period of time. 164 
Ultimately, a patent grants its owner the power to exclude others. 165 
Therefore, by granting the patent holder an effective monopoly, the 
courts have recognized that the patent system by its nature is at odds 
with an antitrust analysis. 166 
2. Absence of the 180-day Exclusivity Period to Subsequent 
ANDA Filers Reduces Incentive to Enter the Market Prior to the 
Expiration ofthe Brand-name Manufacturer's Patent 
The problem presented by reverse payment settlements has its 
origins in the incentive to generic manufacturers to gain the l80-day 
exclusivity period. 167 Previous changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act 
circumvented part of the problem by preventing an initial ANDA filer 
from retaining hold of the 180-day exclusivity period indefmitely; 
however, loopholes still exist in the law. 168 Further amending the law 
to extend the grant of a 180-day exclusivity period to subsequent 
filers after a first filer forfeited the period under one of the provisions 
of 21 USC § 355 U)(5)(D)(iii) represents a potentially small change 
that could bear significant results. Additionally, the need for further 
court involvement or consideration of the pro- or anti-competitive 
effects of an agreement would be obviated by granting subsequent 
ANDA filers the ability to obtain the 180-day exclusivity period. 
Two solutions of this variety, one proposed by Henry N. Butler and 
Jeffrey Paul Jarosch and another under consideration by Congress, 
merit closer scrutiny. 169 
164. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 2, 1807), in 5 THE WRlTINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 74, 76 (H.A. Washington ed. 1853) (noting that "ingenuity should 
receive a liberal encouragement"). 
165. Dawson Chern. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,215 (1980). 
166. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066-67 (2003). 
167. See supra Part III. 
168. See supra Part IV.A. 
169. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 63, at 123-24. 
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3. Two Alternative Solutions Related to the I80-day Exclusivity 
Period 
a. Any ANDAfiler entering a reverse payment settlement 
relinquishes l80-day exclusivity and benefit passes to 
subsequent filer 
Perhaps the simplest solution to the problem of reverse payment 
settlements would be to amend the law so that any ANDA filer who 
accepts a reverse payment settlement would forfeit its right to the 
I80-day exclusivity period and to allow a subsequent ANDA filer to 
be eligible for the exclusivity right. 170 One fundamental problem 
with the current system is the lack of incentive to subsequent ANDA 
filers to pursue the patenting of a generic version of a drug because 
there is less reward to do so once the 180-day exclusivity period is 
not available. l7l Subsequent ANDA filers are not guaranteed the 
duopoly granted to the fIrst ANDA filer, but they still face the specter 
of potentially costly litigation if challenged with infringement by the 
innovator company who holds the brand-name patent. 
The benefits of such an approach are three-fold. First, such an 
amendment would be less controversial than the proposed Preserve 
Access to Affordable Generics Act, which has been before Congress 
for four sessions without success due to vehement opposition by 
conservative congressional members. 172 Second, by allowing 
subsequent filers to be eligible for the I80-day exclusivity period, 
such a change would not discourage valid settlements, yet it would 
still reduce the benefit to a brand-name manufacturer to enter into a 
sham agreement. 173 When faced with the possibility of having to 
settle with multiple generic manufacturer litigants all vying for the 
I80-day exclusivity period, brand-name manufacturers would be less 
likely to settle those cases likely to be decided in their favor as a 
means of obstructing the entry of generic competitors into the 
marketplace. 174 Finally, by making an incremental change, Congress 
could avoid adding to the problems already facing the country with 
respect to health care costs by not enacting legislation that 
overcorrects and overcompensates for the weaknesses currently 
present in the system. 175 
170. !d. at 124. 
17l. See supra Part HA2. 
172. See supra Part IV.C. 
173. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
175. See supra Part IV.C. 
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b. Drug Price Competition Act: Broadening eligibility for the 180-
day exclusivity period 
The Drug Price Competition Act is a variation on this approach. 176 
Rather than the ''wait in line" style approach considered above, the 
Act would permit multiple generic manufacturers to jointly share the 
I80-day exclusivity period, thus widening the group of applicants 
eligible for the incentive. 177 Under this proposal, in order for 
subsequent filers to qualify for the exclusivity period after the initial 
filer, they would need to meet two conditions. First, the subsequent 
filer would have to file its ANDA prior to the first ANDA filer 
commencing marketing of the drug. 17S Second, the subsequent filer 
would need to either survive an infringement challenge by the brand-
name manufacturer brought within forty-five days of filing or not be 
subject to such a challenge at all. 179 
Under this approach, ANDA filers would continue to have 
significant incentive to enter the market ahead of a brand-name 
manufacturer's patent, thus having the potential to lower prices to 
consumers. ISO Brand-name manufacturers would also still have the 
possibility of settling litigation, but the lure of entering a reverse 
payment settlement to slow the entry of generic competitors would be 
reduced given the costs of making payments to mUltiple ANDA filers 
in exchange for their agreement to stay off the market. lSI 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Reverse payment settlements present a unique problem given their 
potential to both help and harm consumers faced with high 
prescription drug prices. ls2 Given the varied nature of these 
settlements and the lack of information publicly available about them, 
176. Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, lllth Congo (2009); Drug Price 
Competition Act of 2009, H.R. 3777, Illth Congo (dailyed. June 22, 2009). At the 
time of this writing, the bill has been not reintroduced during the I 12th Congress. Bill 
Summary & Status, 1 llth Congress (2009 2010) S.J315 All information, 
THOMAS (The Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z 
?dlll :SNOI315:@@@L&sumrn2=m& (last visited May 30,2012). Interestingly, the 
Act did not garner much support during the III th Congress and between the House 
and Senate it collected only 3 supporters. 155 Congo Rec. S6887 (2009); 156 Congo 
Rec. H472 (2010). 
177. S.1315. 
178. 1d. 
179. 1d. 
180. See supra Part III. 
181. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra Part IlI.A. 
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as well as, the cost and time needed for the courts to determine 
whether agreements are anticompetitive or procompetitive under 
antitrust law, alternative solutions to the problem must be 
considered. 183 For these reasons, patent misuse represents one 
possible defense available to subsequent ANDA filers under the 
current system. l84 A better, and simpler, solution would be a small 
alteration to the Hatch-Waxman Act broadening the availability 180-
day exclusivity period so as to provide additional incentive to 
subsequent ANDA filers to enter the market and to reduce the 
incentive to brand-name manufacturers to enter into reverse payment 
settlements in the first place. 185 
Alyssa L. Brownf 
183. See supra Parts IV.B, VA 
184. See supra Part V.A 
185. See supra Part V.B. 
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ERRATA 
The University of Baltimore Law Review regrets the following error 
occurring in Beryl Blaustone, Improving Clinical Judgment in 
LaY1)lering with Multidisciplinary Knowledge About Brain Function 
and Human Behavior: What Should Law Students Learn About 
Human Behaviorfor Effective Lawyering?, 40 U. BALT. L. REv. 607 
(201l). We offer this correction and apologize for any 
inconvenience. 
In footnote 128, the second sentence should read: 
Professor Margaret A. Berger, renowned evidence law professor and 
legal scholar, conducted studies among her law students at Brooklyn 
Law School to demonstrate for them that their inaccurate recall of 
external facts was substantial and that their conviction of belief 
reinforced those inaccuracies. 
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